Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration

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Title:Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration
Creators:
Palokangas, Tapio
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 2, 1, pp. 7-21
Uncontrolled Keywords:immigration, lobbying, labor unions, menu auction

Abstract

This paper examines an economy with following properties. Attempts to restrain illegal immigration incur costs. Illegal workers can work only in the competitive sector. Workers and employers bargain over wages in the unionized sector and lobby the government for immigration policy and workers’ bargaining power. The main findings are as follows. If the government can determine legal immigration, then it expropriates rents from labor unions. In that case, neither workers nor employers are worse off, if legal immigration is increased by an international agreement. High per worker public spending involves border enforcement and the protection of union power.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=37B845D1-51C7-4ABB-8B73-284E1C4E3FC7&articleid=D087550C-5868-493D-8F27-4C6711CE3709

Title:Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration
Creators:
Palokangas, Tapio
Uncontrolled Keywords:immigration, lobbying, labor unions, menu auction
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:2
Number:1
Page Range:pp. 7-21
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:4313
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:01 Jun 2009 18:32
Last Modified:01 Jun 2009 16:32

Citation

Palokangas, Tapio (2008) Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration. AUCO Czech Economic Review, 2 (1). pp. 7-21. ISSN 1802-4696

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