Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design

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Title:Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design
Creators:
Hosli, Madeleine O.
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 2, 1, pp. 76-107
Uncontrolled Keywords:Council of the European Union, decision rules, constitutional design, capacity to act, power indices

Abstract

In the recent past, the choice of adequate voting weights and decision rules for the Council of the European Union (EU) has been a highly contested issue in EU intergovernmental negotiations. In general terms, the selection of a threshold for qualified majority votes (QMV) in the Council constitutes a trade-off in terms of decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased collective ‘capacity to act’. This paper compares the effects of the proposal tabled by the Convention on the Future of Europe with the Nice Treaty provisions and the Lisbon Treaty, in terms of both the efficiency of decision-making and the distribution of relative voting power within the EU of twenty-seven member states. In addition, the paper shows how with the current size of EU membership, the EU risks being unable to reach intergovernmental agreement. Accordingly, a challenging issue for the future of the EU is to move towards reasonable provisions that allow its own constitution – if ever adopted – to get amended.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=37B845D1-51C7-4ABB-8B73-284E1C4E3FC7&articleid=71BFB6DA-FB11-481D-AFAF-7A42ADE74123

Title:Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design
Creators:
Hosli, Madeleine O.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Council of the European Union, decision rules, constitutional design, capacity to act, power indices
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:2
Number:1
Page Range:pp. 76-107
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:4317
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:01 Jun 2009 18:32
Last Modified:01 Jun 2009 16:32

Citation

Hosli, Madeleine O. (2008) Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design. AUCO Czech Economic Review, 2 (1). pp. 76-107. ISSN 1802-4696

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