Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure

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Title:Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure
Creators:
Fragnelli, Vito
Marina, Maria Erminia
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3, 2, pp. 143-154
Uncontrolled Keywords:Knaster’s procedure, misrepresentation, collusion

Abstract

The Knaster’s procedure is one of the simplest and most powerful mechanisms for allocating indivisible objects among agents requiring them, but its sealed bid feature may induce some agents in altering their valuations. In this paper we study the consequences of false declarations on the agents’ payoffs. A misrepresentation of a single agent could produce a gain or a loss. So, we analyze a possible behavior of a subset of infinitely risk-averse agents and propose how to obtain a safe gain via a joint misreporting of their valuations, regardless of the declarations of the other agents.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=416CC5F1-12EA-4C1E-AE92-74B158D15346&articleid=3DFFC4D2-F4D2-4538-A6EF-3634185F2F10

Title:Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure
Creators:
Fragnelli, Vito
Marina, Maria Erminia
Uncontrolled Keywords:Knaster’s procedure, misrepresentation, collusion
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:3
Number:2
Page Range:pp. 143-154
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:4453
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:27 Jul 2009 16:19
Last Modified:27 Jul 2009 14:19

Citation

Fragnelli, Vito; Marina, Maria Erminia (2009) Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure. AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (2). pp. 143-154. ISSN 1802-4696

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