Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining

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Title:Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
Creators:
Schofield, Norman
Ozdemir, Ugur
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3, 3, pp. 207-243
Uncontrolled Keywords:Election, plurality rule, proportional representation, activist groups

Abstract

The key theoretical idea in this paper is that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. These resources are then used by a party to enhance the leader’s valence — the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, will balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. Under proportional electoral rule, there need be no pressure for activist groups to coalesce, leading to multiple political parties. Under plurality rule, however, small parties face the possibility of extinction. An activist group linked to a small party in such a polity has little expectation of influencing government policy. The paper illustrates these ideas by considering recent elections in Turkey, Britain and the United States, as well as a number of European polities.

Official URL: http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/70/type/attachment

Title:Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
Creators:
Schofield, Norman
Ozdemir, Ugur
Uncontrolled Keywords:Election, plurality rule, proportional representation, activist groups
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:3
Number:3
Page Range:pp. 207-243
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:4685
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:07 Dec 2009 16:16
Last Modified:07 Dec 2009 15:16

Citation

Schofield, Norman; Ozdemir, Ugur (2009) Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining. AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (3). pp. 207-243. ISSN 1802-4696

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