Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?

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Title:Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?
Creators:
Nurmi, Hannu
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 4, 1, pp. 5-18
Uncontrolled Keywords:Agenda control, amendment procedure, no-show paradox, successive procedure

Abstract

Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision making tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=F3AA04BB-F486-42D9-9512-1CB4DEC63BAD&articleid=A45EAFD0-82DA-4342-A9EC-9965430A67BD

Title:Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?
Creators:
Nurmi, Hannu
Uncontrolled Keywords:Agenda control, amendment procedure, no-show paradox, successive procedure
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:4
Number:1
Page Range:pp. 5-18
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:5438
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:13 May 2010 17:14
Last Modified:13 May 2010 15:14

Citation

Nurmi, Hannu (2010) Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters? AUCO Czech Economic Review, 4 (1). pp. 5-18. ISSN 1802-4696

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