Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation

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Title:Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
Creators:
Palguta, Jan
Journal or Publication Title:
AUCO Czech Economic Review, 5, 3, pp. 324-346
Uncontrolled Keywords:Voting, manipulation, information, computation-based simulations

Abstract

A minimal reduction in strategic voter’s knowledge about other voters’ voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem about strategic voter‘s complete information about all other voters’ preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in the number of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relative reduction in amount of information.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=7E149E32-0F26-4CDE-BBC4-E8BE11E6A73E&articleid=347EDC46-D45C-4C2A-8277-8FB7C2F43E3D

Title:Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
Creators:
Palguta, Jan
Uncontrolled Keywords:Voting, manipulation, information, computation-based simulations
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume:5
Number:3
Page Range:pp. 324-346
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:6899
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:30 Nov 2011 16:21
Last Modified:30 Nov 2011 15:21

Citation

Palguta, Jan (2011) Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation. AUCO Czech Economic Review, 5 (3). pp. 324-346. ISSN 1802-4696

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