Approval Voting without Faithfulness

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Title:Approval Voting without Faithfulness
Creators:
Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
Journal or Publication Title:
Czech Economic Review, 7, 1, pp. 15-21
Uncontrolled Keywords:Approval voting, faithfulness, inverse approval voting

Abstract

In this short paper, we analyze the implications of dropping the axiom of faithfulness in the axiomatization of approval voting, due to P. C. Fishburn. We show that a ballot aggregation function satisfies the remaining axioms (neutrality, consistency and cancellation) if and only if it is either a function that chooses the whole set of alternatives, or an approval voting, or a function that chooses the least approved alternatives.

Official URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=1DC439B8-6D51-494C-BB74-B3362A53FD83&articleid=8B18E248-529E-4E4A-8456-40CD65789D43

Title:Approval Voting without Faithfulness
Creators:
Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
Uncontrolled Keywords:Approval voting, faithfulness, inverse approval voting
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:Section of external journals > AUCO Czech Economic Review
Journal or Publication Title:Czech Economic Review
Volume:7
Number:1
Page Range:pp. 15-21
ISSN:1802-4696
Publisher:Charles University
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://auco.cuni.czPublisher
http://avi.lib.cas.cz/node/183Publisher
ID Code:7684
Item Type:Article
Deposited On:04 Apr 2013 17:28
Last Modified:04 Apr 2013 15:28

Citation

Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar (2013) Approval Voting without Faithfulness. Czech Economic Review, 7 (1). pp. 15-21. ISSN 1802-4696

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